The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory
Chalmers, D. (1996)
New York: Oxford University Press
- Nominator's statement
- Chalmers expressed, more clearly than anyone before him e.g., Nagel), what previous analyses of the phenomenon of consciousness were leaving out. By defining consciousness as some causal or functional role, it becomes easy to fit into a materialistic worldview. Chalmers challenges that such analyses leave out that which makes consciousness a puzzle: the subjective, qualitative dimension of consciousness. For example, a neuroscientist might describe the causal processes underlying color vision, but why does an *experience of color* accompany the said causal process? Such questions are never answered by causal/functional/computational accounts of consciousness. Unlike most philosophers before him, Chalmers exhibits a mastery of attempts to deal with consciousness in cognitive science, and makes a noble effort to debunk them all. Whether you love or hate Chalmers, his book belongs on the list.
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